THE MEANING, MEASURE, AND MISUSE OF STANDARDS OF REVIEW

by

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Standards of review should be the appellate court’s first consideration when it reviews the trial court decision on appeal. Yet, so often it is ignored or misused. This article seeks to explore the history of modern-day standards of review and the policy reasons for their creation. It uses empirical data collected from two sample jurisdictions, California and Texas, to identify ways that courts ignore, confuse, and misuse standards of review. The purpose of this article is to illustrate how standards of review are supposed to work in theory, demonstrate how they are often abused in practice, and encourage judges and appellate practitioners to recognize and confront problems that arise with the use of standards of review.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Anyone who has ever had to draft a judicial opinion or an appellate brief has had to come to terms with standards of review. They are “the essential language of appeals.” They are the “keystone to court of appeals decision-making.” Standards of review play a critical role in the appellate decision-making process; however, they are sometimes ignored, manipulated, or misunderstood. Perhaps this is because many lawyers and judges have a hard time understanding them. Scholars and academics have difficulty explaining standards of review consistently and often resort to using metaphors and analogies to describe their purpose.

4. See, e.g., W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 34 St. Mary’s L.J. 1, 8 (calling the standards of review “the appellate court’s ‘measuring stick’”) (quoting John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. L.J. 801, 810 (1976)); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 679, 682–83 (2002) (analogizing standard of review to a telescope and using a sports metaphor to explain the appellate review process);
As one scholar stated, "standard[s] of review [are] far easier to describe than to define." Even many law dictionaries fail to define the term "standard of review," which compels lawyers and judges to create their own definitions.

However, standards of review are not as complex as some may believe. Appellate courts exist primarily to review trial court decisions. If a case is appealed, an appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for error. Appellate courts exercise control over trial court decisions through their authority to reverse. However, that authority has parameters. Each issue that is appealed—whether it is an argument about the admission of evidence or a complaint about the trial court's application of law—is controlled by a standard of review. The standard of review guides the appellate court in determining "how 'wrong' the lower court has to be before it will be reversed." Maurice Rosenberg, professor of law at Colombia University Law School and one of the earliest and most quoted commentators on standards of review, once stated, "[t]here are wide variations in the degree of 'wrongness' which will be tolerated" by appellate courts.

When used properly, standards of review require appellate judges to exercise self-restraint and in so doing, act to create a more respected and consistent body of appellate law and a more efficient judicial system. When judges manipulate the standard of review's scope, or ignore its underlying purpose, an inconsistent and unreliable body of law results. One commentator aptly noted the various methods of manipulation as follows:

Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231, 232 (1991) (describing standards of review as the "height of the hurdles over which an appellant must leap"); Alvin B. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REV. 869, 873 (1983) (stating that standards of review "indicate the decibel level at which the appellate advocate must play to catch the judicial ear.").

Hofer, supra note 4, at 232.


Kim, supra note 7, at 418 (stating that "reviewing courts [must] exercise self-restraint in the use of their reversal power").

See Robert L. Byer, Judge Aldisert's Contribution to Appellate Methodology: Emphasizing and Defining Standards of Review, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. xvi (1987) (asserting standards of review, when used as boilerplate, “had the appearance of being used not to confine the boundaries of appellate review prior to deciding particular issues in the case, but rather as mechanistic incantations inserted to justify a predetermined result.”).
Some courts invoke [standards of review] talismannically to authenticate the rest of their opinions. . . . Other courts use standard[s] of review to create an illusion of harmony between the appropriate result and the applicable law. . . . Finally, some courts disregard standard[s] of review in their analysis entirely.¹²

Though this observation was made nearly fifteen years ago, courts continue to wrestle with standards of review, often treating them like “automated verbiage” or worse.¹³

Few articles have been written about standards of review in general. No article has examined how standards of review, when applied, differ from what they were meant to accomplish in theory. Furthermore, no article has ever used empirical data to illustrate the ways that courts abuse standards of review. This Article seeks to do those things. It attempts to identify the policy reasons that led to the creation of standards of review. It also endeavors to demonstrate, by using empirical data collected from over 8,000 cases in two sample jurisdictions, the various ways that appellate courts routinely misuse standards of review.

Section II of this Article will discuss the history of modern day standards of review and the reasons for their use. Section III will briefly identify and comment on the most commonly used standards of review. Section four will discuss the problems that arise when standards of review are not fully understood or properly employed by appellate courts. Section IV will also examine judicial opinions and empirical data gathered from Texas and California. These two sample jurisdictions illustrate how appellate judges sometimes disregard or manipulate the various standards of review. Section V suggests possible ways to prevent the abuse of standards of review. This Article concludes by pressing appellate courts to recognize the significance of standards of review and to abide by their limitations, so that the actions of the appellate court and the body of law created by the court rise above suspicion.

II. BACKGROUND AND POLICIES OF STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Finding a general history on standards of review is virtually impossible. Though some articles have discussed particular standards of review in specific jurisdictions,¹⁴ few have explored the entire history of

¹³ Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 659 (1971).
modern day standards of review. One must research the language of the standards to determine when they began to affect appellate review.

Common phrases and terminology pervade the various standards of review used across the country. Some of the common phrases and words include “clearly erroneous,” “abuse of discretion,” “substantial evidence,” and “de novo.” The phrases are somewhat antiquated and can be traced far back into America’s jurisprudence. For example, the phrase “abuse of discretion” can be traced back to decisions rendered around 1800. In those early opinions, the phrase had at least two definitions: sometimes it was used to describe a judge’s actions, and other times it was used to characterize the level of error that would warrant reversal on appeal.

Though the language for modern-day standards of review can be traced to early American opinions, the concept of standards of review was not firmly rooted in opinions until the latter part of the twentieth century. For example, one scholar found that in a search of opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the phrase “standard of review” did not appear at all prior to 1969, materialized only a handful of times in the 1970s, began to surface more regularly in the 1980s, and began appearing frequently starting in the 1990s.


*But see Kunsch, supra note 12, at 15–19 (examining the historical antecedents of modern-day standards of review).*

*See, e.g., Emmett v. Stedman, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 32, 33 (Super. Ct. 1797) (using the term “clearly erroneous” to describe the trial court’s action); St. Louis Agric. & Mech. Ass’n v. Delano, 37 Mo. App. 284, 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1889) (“[W]e are not, however, concerned with the question, whether there is a preponderance of evidence supporting the conclusion of the court; it is enough for us to see that it is supported by substantial evidence, and of this there is no doubt.”).*

*See supra note 17. See also Postell v. Postell’s Ex’rs, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 173, 173 (S.C.Ch., 1790) (stating that where a decree was clearly erroneous, it had to be amended).*

*G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV 1 (2005) (tracing the development of the United States Supreme Court’s various constitutional scrutiny standards of review from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), to the twentieth century).*

*Mary M. Schroeder, Appellate Justice Today: Fairness or Formulas, The Fairchild Lecture, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 9, 19–20 (1994). See also Andrew M. Mead, Abuse of Discretion: Maine’s Application of a Malleable Appellate Standard, 57 Me. L. REV. 519, 530 (2005) (noting the increasing frequency with which the term “abuse of discretion” began appearing in Maine opinions throughout the later part of the twentieth century).*
One can find the earliest formulations of modern-day standards of review beginning in the late 1950s and 1960s.\(^\text{21}\) The first commentators on standards of review began to discuss them in the 1970s and 1980s.\(^\text{22}\) However, it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that appellate courts routinely began to include a discussion on the applicable standard of review in most opinions.\(^\text{23}\) As Martha Davis, professor and coauthor of the treatise *Federal Standards of Review*\(^\text{24}\) stated, “[t]he idea of using standards to guide appellate review of decisions of tribunals below has existed from the beginning of American jurisprudence, but the articulation of those standards is a fairly recent and still not always clear development.” Having established that standards of review, as we know them today, are relatively modern creatures, it is important to examine why they were created and what purposes they serve.

### A. The Purposes of Standards of Review

Standards of review balance the power among the courts, enhance judicial economy, standardize the appellate process, and give the parties in a lawsuit an idea of their chance of success on appeal. All of these policies are interconnected. And, when appellate court judges use standards of review faithfully and consistently, these principles are upheld. An examination of the policies underlying standards of review leads to an appreciation of their role in judicial decision making and an appreciation of the significant negative effect brought about when they are misunderstood, manipulated, or ignored.

#### B. Balance of Power

“It runs strongly against the grain of our traditions to grant uncontrollable and unreviewable power to a single judge.”\(^\text{26}\)

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\(^\text{23}\) See, e.g., California empirical data, on file with author.

\(^\text{24}\) CHILDRESS & DAVIS, *supra* note 1.


\(^\text{26}\) Rosenberg, *supra* note 9, at 184.
Consequently, every American jurisdiction has a hierarchy that includes a trial court and at least one reviewing court. Trial courts and appellate courts serve different functions. The trial court is charged with determining the facts of the case at hand and applying the correct law to those facts. One scholar noted the following about the trial court’s role in the judicial system:

In an ongoing trial, many factors interact and accumulate. For certain issues, interaction among the entire panoply of factors is essential background for a decision. This interaction cannot be entirely reflected in the record. Because the trial judge is able to observe all the happenings at a trial first hand, his or her decisions about such issues should be accorded substantial deference.\(^{27}\)

In contrast to the trial court’s expertise as first-hand observer, fact finder, and litigation manager,\(^{28}\) the appellate court is primarily interested in reviewing the trial court’s decisions and ascertaining whether the law has been correctly applied. Because appellate courts typically focus on legal analysis instead of fact determination, and because they sit in multi-judge panels, they are in a better position to analyze decisions of law.\(^{29}\)

Standards of review help judges in trial and appellate courts maintain a healthy respect for the others’ strengths.\(^{30}\) Standards of review “assign power among judicial actors.”\(^{31}\) They force the appellate court to recognize that the trial court proceedings were not just a warm-up exercise for the appellate court and that the decision reached in the lower court should be the final determination unless, of course, the error was harmful.\(^{32}\)

The decision of the trial court becomes meaningless\(^{33}\) when appellate judges fail to exercise self-restraint. Standards of review guide appellate courts into the uniform exercise of their judicial authority and help them reign in their power when it may have exceeded acceptable

\(^{27}\) Kunsch, supra note 12, at 35.

\(^{28}\) See Kim, supra note 7, at 425 (stating that trial judges are experts at determining witness credibility and facts).

\(^{29}\) See id. at 457.

\(^{30}\) See Hall, supra note 4, at 8; Kim, supra note 7, at 442 (“How lower court judges should decide when they have discretion is a difficult and highly contested issue, one that goes to important questions about institutional design and the appropriate balance between centralizing judicial authority and sharing that power between levels of the hierarchy.”); Maloy, supra note 6, at 609 (standards of review “assure that the separate functions of trial and appellate courts in a judicial system are maintained.”).

\(^{31}\) Hall, supra note 4, at 8; see also Kim, supra note 7, at 442 (arguing that standards of review reign in appellate court discretion when it is in conflict with trial court discretion).


boundaries. The standard of review, in theory at least, works to balance the unique strengths each court possesses.

C. Judicial Economy

The balance of judicial power and the theory of judicial economy go hand in hand. “Standards of review exist so that the legal process may work efficiently and fairly.” If appellate courts examine all of the decisions made below without any deference to rulings, then the trial court’s proceedings are meaningless. However, a deferential standard of review not only works to preserve the integrity of the trial court, it also serves to protect the appellate court’s valuable time and resources. These resources would be wasted if appellate courts attempted to re-litigate trials on appeal. Indeed, such efforts result in a poor use of judicial resources since appellate judges can only glean facts from “sterile printed pages.” As the United States Supreme Court noted:

Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. . . . [T]he parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to

86 Casey et. al., supra note 33, at 359 (describing the need for standards of review to avoid the effort of appellate retrial). See also Brent E. Kidwell, A Nation Divided: By What Standard Should Fourth Amendment Seizure Findings Be Reviewed On Appeal?, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 117, 138 (1992) (arguing that reassessing facts from a cold reporter’s record is unfair to litigants).
87 See Hofer, supra note 4, at 241.
88 Earl R. Waddell III & Tracy L. Abell, A New Evidentiary Standard for Criminal Appellate Review: Clewis v. State, 3 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 225, 271 (1997). See also Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (“What this case boils down to is whether in criminal cases the appellate courts can substitute their judgment for the jury’s on questions of credibility and weight of the evidence. Because the majority does not leave these matters to be resolved at the local level of the jury, I dissent.”); id. at 159 (White, J., dissenting) (“[F]rom this day forward, the decision by the majority will permit on some occasions as few as three judges of a mid-level appellate court to substitute their own personal judgment of the evidence for the decision of the twelve citizens of a jury who observed the witnesses and determined their credibility and truthfulness, personally listened to the presentation of testimony and physical exhibits, assessed the weight and credibility of all the evidence, and rendered a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt based upon all of this under the direction of the instructions of an experienced trial court. This decision is no less than an usurpation of the jury’s role as the finder of fact in criminal cases.”); Elizabeth A. Ryan, The 13th Juror: Re-Evaluating the Need for a Factual Sufficiency Review in Criminal Cases, 37 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1291, 1294 (2005) (asking, “What has happened to the jury in Texas?”).
concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much.\textsuperscript{39}

Standards of review facilitate judicial economy not only because they prevent relitigation of the trial on appeal, but also because they simplify and focus the court's review process.\textsuperscript{40} By permitting the appellate court to sign off on a number of trial court decisions,\textsuperscript{41} standards of review allow the appellate court the opportunity to spend more time and resources on a careful review of the issues raised on appeal.

\textbf{D. Standardized Review Process}

Closely connected to the policy of judicial economy is the idea of a uniform review process. A standardized review process is the ideal.\textsuperscript{42} Because an appellate court’s role is merely to review decisions made in the trial court, it is necessary for appellate courts to adopt and apply consistent standards of review. Without such a standardized procedure, the appellate court would simply be substituting its judgment for that of the trial court, or, as the United States Supreme Court has described, sitting as “a thirteenth juror.”\textsuperscript{43} While it is true that a small number of issues on appeal do require the appellate judge to view the evidence as a juror,\textsuperscript{44} most do not. Standards of review make sure each appellate judge sees the issues presented on appeal from the same angle. Additionally, they make sure the judge’s view is an appropriate one.

\textbf{E. Notice to Parties}

When an appellate court’s review is standardized, the parties interested in appealing a lower court decision have a better understanding of what to expect on appeal. Appellants with less compelling claims have a more realistic view about their chances of winning and are less likely to file a frivolous appeal.\textsuperscript{45} As one commentator in Utah stated, “[s]tandards of review doom any number of appeals from the start . . . and are critical in tailoring the client’s

\textsuperscript{39} Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985).
\textsuperscript{40} See Michael H. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence At Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585, 659 (1989).
\textsuperscript{41} Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 181 (suggesting that others have argued that judicial economy requires an appellate court to “sign off on a large proportion of the decisions a trial court makes, for otherwise it would never be able to get its work done”).
\textsuperscript{42} See Cook, supra note 35, at 266 (suggesting that in theory, a standard of review should result in standardized precedent).
\textsuperscript{43} Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982).
\textsuperscript{44} See infra notes 158–73 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{45} See Bauman, supra note 3, at 521 (stating that standards of review “send a clear message to the bar that not all matters should be appealed”).
expectations of what can realistically be achieved.”

The American Academy of Appellate Practitioners recently suggested that the success of appellate settlements rests upon an appellate lawyer’s ability to educate trial attorneys and clients about the remedies available on appeal and the standards of review that govern the review process. Without such uniformity in the appellate decision-making process, appellants are unable to gauge success on appeal and are more likely to waste judicial resources.

F. Conclusion

Standards of review balance power among judges, create a more efficient judicial system, make sure that similar cases are decided similarly, and provide notice to potential appellants about the likely outcome on appeal. These four policies work together to guarantee that the system is functioning properly and to ensure public confidence in the appellate process. In order to understand more fully how standards of review are falling short of these goals, it is important to briefly discuss the most commonly used standards of review.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW: TERMS OF ART THAT GUIDE THE APPELLATE REVIEW PROCESS

Judge Posner once stated that “there are more verbal formulas for the scope of appellate review . . . than there are distinctions actually capable of being drawn in the practice of appellate review.” Numerous articles have detailed the most frequently used standards of review in appellate courts across the nation. While commentators have noted up

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48 See Kunsch, supra note 12, at 19–20 (asserting that with more deferential review, parties are less likely to appeal, which conserves court resources and maintains trial court morale).

49 United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995).

to thirty different standards of review,\(^{51}\) many of these are just variations of the four most common standards of review, which are abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous, substantial evidence, and de novo. A brief discussion and a general commentary on these standards of review will follow.

**A. The Standards of Review Spectrum**

Most academics, scholars, and commentators who discuss standards of review tend to plot them on an imaginary spectrum.\(^{52}\) In fact, this is often how they are “defined,” since the standard of review’s language fails to accurately describe how broad its scope actually is. On this spectrum, abuse of discretion is the standard of review that is most deferential to the trial judge’s rulings.\(^{53}\) Clearly erroneous and substantial evidence are usually plotted in the middle of the imaginary continuum and de novo is plotted on the opposite end of abuse of discretion because it is the least deferential standard of review.\(^{54}\)

**B. Abuse of Discretion**

The abuse of discretion standard, which is the most deferential to trial court decisions, is often used to review procedural matters decided by the trial court.\(^{55}\) Perhaps no other standard of review has been

\(^{51}\) Maloy, *supra* note 6, at 610–11 (noting thirty various standards of review and observing that state courts are more inclined to adopt unique or variant standards than federal courts).


\(^{53}\) *E.g.*, People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1074 (Ill. 1998) (The Illinois Supreme Court has also recognized that the abuse of discretion standard is “the most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.”) (quoting Martha S. Davis, *A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review*, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 469, 480 (1988)); *In re N.M. Indirect Purchasers Microsoft Corp.*, 149 P.3d 976, 986 (N.M. Ct. App., 2006) (describing abuse of discretion as “already one of the most deferential standards of review”).

\(^{54}\) See Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1074.

\(^{55}\) *See, e.g.*, Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 (1988) (using abuse of discretion to review evidentiary rulings); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 103 (1981) (reviewing decisions to grant or deny a trial court motion for abuse of discretion); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 160 E.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999) (reviewing the denial of a discovery order for abuse of discretion).
discussed more. While the phrase “abuse of discretion” initially appeared in American decisions rendered in the late 18th and early 19th century, the term has never been consistently defined, which has led to criticism. One California appellate judge stated that abuse of discretion “is so amorphous as to mean everything and nothing at the same time and [is] virtually useless as an analytic tool.” To counter vagueness, some jurisdictions have gradations of abuse of discretion review. Other courts tack on additional verbiage to their abuse of discretion standard in an attempt to more clearly delineate its boundaries. In some jurisdictions, abuse of discretion is defined so that a reversal is warranted only if the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or irrational. Other jurisdictions state that a judge abuses her discretion when she acts outside the scope of the applicable law. Regardless of the definition, however, in practice it is a difficult standard for an appellant to overcome. Consequently, as a matter of strategy, appellants often


57 See, e.g., Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns 815, 820 (N.Y. 1811) (“The law places a just confidence in the judges, that they will act with caution and deliberation, and will not abuse their discretion.”); Eldridge v. Lippincott, 1 N.J.L. 455, 456–57 (N.J. 1795) (“The law gives the court a complete and unlimited discretion, subject to control only when it appears to have abused its powers to arbitrary or fraudulent purposes.”).

58 See Davis, supra note 25, at 77 (“Clearly, there is no such thing as one abuse of discretion standard. It is at most a useful generic term . . .[that] more accurately describes a range of appellate responses.”).


61 Davis, supra note 25, at 77.

62 See infra notes 119–21 (for a discussion on Pennsylvania and Colorado courts that found the surplus language on their abuse of discretion standard of review confusing).


64 See, e.g., Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996) (abuse of discretion happens when trial court makes findings unsupported by the evidence or improperly applies the law); State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251, 1256 (Wash. 2007) (defining one type of abuse of discretion as applying the wrong legal standard).

65 See Arneson v. Arneson, 670 N.W.2d 904, 910 (S.D. 2003) (stating that despite being hard to define, abuse of discretion amounts to “a fundamental error of
avoid framing issues on appeal which require review under this highly deferential standard.

C. Clearly Erroneous

A trial court’s determinations, which are based upon its findings of fact, are often reviewed under the clearly erroneous or clear error standard of review.66 Like abuse of discretion, this standard of review grants the trial court much deference. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals once stated that in order for a trial court’s decision to warrant reversal under this standard, the determination must be “dead wrong,” so wrong that it must be “more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.”67 Along the same lines, but with perhaps less vivid imagery, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that a reviewing court must not reverse the trial court under this standard of review merely because it disagrees with it or because it would have interpreted the facts differently.68

[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.69

Though not as deferential as abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous review is still very respectful of the trial court’s factual determinations.

D. Substantial Evidence

The substantial evidence standard is used to examine factual determinations made in the lower trial court. When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision, the reviewing court has no authority to reverse the lower court,70 which seems clear enough on first reading. The problem with this standard, as some commentators suggest, is that there is effectively no difference between it and the clearly erroneous standard judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable”).


Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1989).


Id. at 575.

See, e.g., Rupf v. Yan, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157, 170 n.5 (Cal. Ct. Rptr. 2000) (stating that the appellate court must not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s judgment when substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s decision).
of review. However, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that the distinction between substantial evidence and clear error is “a subtle one—so fine that (apart from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.”

E. De Novo

De novo review is generally reserved for the review of legal issues. De novo review of legal issues dates back to the formation of our country. The Latin phrase “de novo” means “anew” or “from the beginning.” Courts using de novo review examine the trial court’s application of the law without affording the lower court discretion. But even de novo review is subject to interpretation.

To contrast the difference between de novo review, which is the least deferential standard, and abuse of discretion, which is the most deferential, one commentator suggested that under de novo review, the lower court’s determination is protected by “a gossamer film” whereas under abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision “is safeguarded by a Kevlar shield.” Theoretically, appellate courts have much more authority to reverse a trial court using de novo review and far less authority to reverse a trial court using abuse of discretion, which can be viewed as the polar opposite of de novo review.

71 E.g., Casey et. al., supra note 33, at 308 (suggesting that because application of either test usually results in the same result—an affirmance of the trial court decision—the practical differences between the two are hard to decipher).
72 See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 4, at 689 n.36 (“’Clearly erroneous’ is distinguished from ‘substantial evidence’ in theory although the two standards are often equated in practice.”).
74 Kunsch, supra note 12, at 37.
75 Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 912 (1989) (“[I]ndependent appellate inquiry into questions of law has marked our republic’s legal system from its earliest days.”).
77 See Steven Alan Childress, A 1995 Primer on Standards of Review in Federal Civil Appeals, 161 F.R.D. 123, 128 (1995) (asserting that de novo means that the appellate court does not give the trial court any deference, not that it requires a full rehearing or new findings of fact); Casey et al., supra note 33, at 290 (suggesting that even though the appellate court is entitled to review the issue anew, in practice the appellate court cannot escape examining the trial court’s reasoning for the decision, which may have a “subtle effect” on the appellate court’s determination).
78 Allegra, supra note 32, at 473.
79 Peterson, supra note 52, at 263 (stating that deferential review of facts and de novo “occupy the polar ends of the discretion spectrum”).
F. Conclusion

Each standard of review serves to perform a specific task and all but de novo review grant the trial court considerable discretion in making decisions. Theoretically, standards of review are one thing; in practice, they are often another. As Martha S. Davis states, “[t]he labels identifying the levels or intensity of appellate review sound deceptively simple, but not one of them admits of easy analysis.”

IV. EXPOSING THE PROBLEMS IN STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICATION

The goal of this section is to analyze the problems with standards of review in their application. It would be impossible to examine how every jurisdiction uses each of its standards of review. But, if the focus was shifted from the more universal to the more specific, then the outcomes of a single legal issue reviewed under a single standard of review could be compared. Of course, with similar facts, similar issues, and similar standards of review, one would expect similar outcomes. But that is not what always happens.

For the purpose of keeping the focus of this Article more specific and less abstract, the author chose to examine two sample jurisdictions, California and Texas, in an attempt to illustrate how standards of review are sometimes misused. California and Texas were chosen because they both have a large body of law and their standards of review, unlike many smaller jurisdictions, do not mimic those used in the federal system. Rather, they are sometimes uniquely worded and periodically undergo revision. Because of these characteristics, they provide a rich sample of law and fertile ground for analysis of their application.

While there are appellate judges in every jurisdiction who respect trial court decisions and defer to the degree required under the appropriate standard of review, other judges do not. Often appellate judges ignore the standards of review, are confused by them, or cleverly manipulate them to achieve a specific result. When one considers the innate ambiguities in the language of the standards of review themselves and the fact that they limit the authority of the appellate judges, it is no wonder that some appellate courts attempt to resist the restraint imposed by the controlling standard of review. This section will explore some of the difficulties inherent in the application of standards of review.

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80 Davis, supra note 25, at 49.
81 See also Cook, supra note 35, at 266 (noting that appeals in the Federal Circuit on patent claim construction cases lead to inconsistent and conflicting lines of authority, in part because of the high reversal rate under the de novo standard of review).
A. Problem Number One: Their Ambiguous Language

As Steven Alan Childress, coauthor of the treatise *Federal Standards of Review*\(^{82}\) said, “The various catchphrases associated with standards of review are often difficult for court and counsel to define and apply in practice.”\(^{83}\) That he said it more than ten years ago makes no difference; standards of review still plague judges and attorneys in their application. This section will examine the theoretical problems with the language of the standards of review and it will identify ways that courts have tried and failed to clarify their language with definitions.

Standards are hard to define and apply, in part, because of their terminology.\(^{84}\) Their language is often inexact, which makes their boundaries imprecise. Standard of review language has been described as defining moods, rather than precisely defining legal boundaries.\(^{85}\) Justice Felix Frankfurter once called standards of review “undefined defining terms.”\(^{86}\) Consequently, academics have resorted to defining standards of review through an imaginary spectrum,\(^{87}\) which poses a unique problem.

The continuum illustration, at best, gives a judge only a vague understanding of the boundaries each standard of review imposes. One commentator rejected the idea of a continuum altogether because the various standards implicate different approaches; for example, substantial evidence looks at the quantum of evidence supporting the trial court’s decision, de novo requires scrutinized examination from a different judge’s viewpoint, and clear error and abuse of discretion require an impressionistic perspective of the alleged error’s degree.\(^{88}\) From this analysis, it is apparent that the standard of review continuum is flawed.

Some critics praise standards of review for their ambiguity, believing that their imprecise nature allows courts to apply them to the wide variety of cases they encounter.\(^{89}\) However, when the language of the standard itself is vague, courts are more likely to define the standard, heaping on qualifiers and explanations so that it becomes more convoluted over

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\(^{82}\) Childress & Davis, *supra* note 1, at 266.

\(^{83}\) Childress, *supra* note 77, at 126.

\(^{84}\) *Fallon, supra* note 21, at 1271–72 (asserting that one of the problems with strict scrutiny review is that it confuses practitioners with its vague terminology).

\(^{85}\) Casey et al., *supra* note 33, at 284.


\(^{87}\) *Allegra, supra* note 32, at 462–73 (mapping abuse of discretion, substantial evidence, clearly erroneous, and de novo, from most deferential to least deferential standard of review); Verkuil, *supra* note 4, at 691 (coining standard deference as a “verbally defined sliding scale”).

\(^{88}\) *Kunsch, supra* note 12, at 14.

\(^{89}\) *Kim, supra* note 7, at 410 (stating rules of law need an “open texture” to apply to the variety of situations judges encounter) (quoting H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* 124 (1961)); Kunsch, *supra* note 12, at 13 (stating that standards of review “are and should be flexible”).
time. Added definitions are sometimes just as vague as the standard of review language. One commentator in Michigan stated that the Michigan abuse of discretion “definition has been both quoted and assailed and the precise meaning of the phrase . . . evolves with the composition of the court.” Michigan is not alone.

1. Case Study: California’s Abuse of Discretion Definition

The author examined nearly 250 opinions in California related to motions to disqualify counsel appeals. The author chose to review this body of law because it is a smaller class of appeals with an evolving abuse of discretion standard of review. The author studied every California appeal that included an issue regarding a motion to disqualify counsel. The author catalogued the following data upon reading each case: the citation, appellate court division, year of decision, participating judges, outcome at trial, outcome on appeal, standard of review used, and subsequent history. The author also noted any unusual holdings or dicta in relation to the standard of review. The data and notes were used to closely examine the application of the standard of review in California intermediate appellate courts. This data illustrates that California’s attempts to define “abuse of discretion” in the context of motions to disqualify attorney appeals are an example of how standard of review language can become hazy even with valiant attempts at clarification.

In California, the state appellate courts use one of three standards of review: abuse of discretion, substantial evidence, and de novo review. The trial court’s granting or denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Unique policy considerations are involved in motions to disqualify attorneys and these policy considerations sometimes weigh against the abuse of discretion standard.

Appellate courts in California have recognized that motions to disqualify can be used to harass opposing counsel, to delay litigation, and to force an adversary to settle the case for far less than it is worth. Indeed, parties sometimes ask that opposing counsel be removed from

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90 See Kunsch, supra note 12, at 49 (asserting that adding more qualifying and defining language to standard of review terminology further confuses matters).
92 See Jon B. Eisenberg, Ellis J. Horvitz & Howard B. Wiener, Scope and Limits of Appellate Review, in CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL APPEALS AND WRITS 8:33–35 (2008). These three standards are the commonly used and understood standards of review. California has a fourth standard of review: “Presumption in favor of the appellant: A standard of limited application which, in certain narrow circumstances, requires review by presuming the truth of allegations or evidence favorable to appellant” Id. at 8:36.
93 Id. at 8:94.1.
95 E.g. Reed v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
the case for purely strategic reasons, not because there is an actual conflict of interest. Another fact taken into consideration by both the trial and appellate courts is that the client’s right to her counsel of choice must be delicately weighed against the need to maintain ethical standards in the legal profession. Because of these considerations, appellate courts must make sure they respect trial court rulings on motions to disqualify counsel, carefully examine the motives for filing the motion, and protect the party’s interests in keeping the lawyer on the case. This is no easy task for the reviewing court.

Before 1999, California courts almost always used the abuse of discretion standard to review motion to disqualify appeals. During this time, however, lower appellate courts defined abuse of discretion in different ways; some of those definitions were at best problematic and at worst completely inadequate. For example, in the late 1970s a few California appellate courts stated that an abuse of discretion occurs “in the rare instance when the facts command discretion be exercised in but one way.” Another poor definition used in the 1970s simply stated that a trial court’s discretion must not be inappropriately exercised. Neither definition explains the basis for the appellate court’s determination. Both definitions are crafted with nebulous language that fails to add anything meaningful to the term “abuse of discretion;” rather, they muddy the already murky waters of the standard of review’s language.

The definitions California courts gave to abuse of discretion continued to change over the next couple of decades, but some still were poorly written. Perhaps the worst definition assigned to that standard is one that was used in the early 1990s: “Discretion is deemed abused when there is a failure to exercise discretion in a situation where such exercise is required.” This definition is circular. Using poorly conceived definitions, an appellate court can reverse simply by disagreeing with the decision the trial judge made. It is difficult to understand how these ill-defined definitions guided the review process, how they informed the

98 *See* *SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc.*, 980 P.2d at 377–78.
101 *Comden*, 576 P.2d at 974.
102 *See* People v. Wolfe, 138 Cal. Rptr. 235, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (review is “subject to [the] appropriate exercise of the trial court’s discretion in a particular case”).
appellate judiciary of its scope of review, or how they educated the trial court on what it should avoid doing in future cases. How can an appellate court understand the limits of its review process when the language defining the standard of review is so ambiguous?

As scholars have noted, the practical application of standards of review is complicated through “the difficulty of using relatively crude linguistic distinctions to calibrate different levels of deference in particular settings.”\(^\text{104}\) When courts cloud these “crude linguistic distinctions” with nebulous definitions, it does nothing to clarify the review process.\(^\text{105}\) Many practitioners already have a difficult time grasping standards of review. Blurry and ill-conceived definitions layered on top of already vague standard of review language ends up creating more problems.\(^\text{106}\)

B. Problem Number Two: Judges Fail to Recognize Standards of Review

Standards of review are conceptually hard for even law-trained minds to understand.\(^\text{107}\) They have been described by judges and scholars as confusing to apply and explain.\(^\text{108}\) As a result, some appellate judges treat standards of review as mere “automated verbiage” and “knee-jerk

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\(^{105}\) Id.

\(^{106}\) See Tracy Lipinski, *Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey Narrows the Judicial Strike Zone of Arbitration Awards*, 36 *Akron L. Rev.* 325, 350 (2003) (“The result of these vague and confusing judicially created standards for review [in arbitration award appeals] is that losing parties in arbitration proceedings often attempt to overturn the award on one of these imprecise grounds, even though such attempts are almost always futile.”).


\(^{108}\) People v. Jackson, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“As straightforward as the standards of review may appear, they can be more confusing than enlightening in some applications.”); Hall, *supra* note 4, at 10 (“Identifying the standard of review in most cases is not complicated. Like tying a shoe, it is often easier to demonstrate the proper use of the standard of review than it is to explain that use.”).
By including the applicable standard in the opinion, but not recognizing that it serves a practical purpose just like any substantive law, courts fail to realize the worth of the standard and keep it in its conceptual, not practical, form. Thus, appellate courts are sometimes confused by standards of review and they demonstrate their confusion in two ways: they improperly label substantive law as a standard of review, or they create and inconsistently use standards of review in the appellate process.

1. Mislabeling

Some courts express confusion by mislabeling a substantive rule of law a standard of review. Scholars have written about this practice time and time again, even implicating the United States Supreme Court with making this mistake. Michael R. Smith, Director of Legal Writing at Wyoming College of Law, noted at a recent legal writing conference that many states have misidentified a rule of law as a standard of review, which further confuses the appellate review process. Smith identified

109 See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 659.
110 See Stevenson, supra note 56, at 127 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for its faulty application of the abuse of discretion standard of review).
111 See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 829, 833–39 (2007) (detailing confusion over the business judgment rule as either an evidentiary presumption, standard of review, or abstention doctrine); McGee & Howell, supra note 66, at 558 (stating that “the legislature was confused in thinking ‘preponderance of the evidence’ was a standard of review rather than the evidentiary standard of quantum of proof”); Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. Rev. 1735, 1739 (2006) (“Perhaps the most perverse aspect of the Supreme Court’s current Section Five jurisprudence has been to confuse the standard of review with the Constitution itself and thereby impose on Congress what had been a rule of judicial deference.”); Bauman, supra note 3, at 521 (stating that “practitioners often mistake the substantive standard to be applied to the legal issue for the appropriate standard of review”); Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1083, 1137 (2001) (accusing the Second Circuit of confusing scope of review with standards of review in ERISA claim appeals); Kunsch, supra note 12, at 13. See also Evans v. Buchanan, 468 F. Supp. 944, 950 (D. Del. 1979) (“Burden of proof should not be confused with standard of review.”).

113 Michael R. Smith, Fog on the Lens: Appellate Court Confusion Between Standards of Review and Substantive Rules, presented at the Seventh Annual Rocky Mountain Legal Writing Conference at University of Nevada, Las Vegas on March 9–10, 2007 (presentation on file with author) (criticizing courts in Texas, Mississippi, Kansas, Missouri, Alabama, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, California, Iowa, New Mexico, Arkansas, South Dakota, Kentucky, North Dakota, Louisiana, and Indiana for mislabeling substantive legal principles as standards of review). See also James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, 54 SMU L. Rev. 1417, 1468 (2001) (stating that the “clear and convincing” standard of review in Texas has confused courts because it is also used to describe a burden of proof, among other things); Thomas F. Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can’t Agree, Who Really Decides? Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 36 Clev. St. L.
opinions from seventeen different states where the reviewing court inaccurately labeled a substantive rule of law a standard of review.\(^{114}\) This evidence demonstrates that appellate courts do not grasp either the theoretical underpinnings or the practical applications of standards of review.\(^{115}\) It also creates discord among the levels of judiciary because appellate judges, by mistaking the authority they possess to review the lower court’s decision, may improperly exceed the limits of their power.

2. **Inconsistency**

Appellate courts sometimes alter the prevailing standard of review or create a new and unprecedented standard of review,\(^{116}\) demonstrating a “propensity for spontaneously generating standards of review.”\(^{117}\) The Second and Sixth Circuits have been cited with creating new standards by rewording United States Supreme Court standards of review.\(^{118}\) Colorado’s Supreme Court encountered a problem with modified standards of review, which created the appearance of inconsistency and unfairness.\(^{119}\) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise had to delete standard of review surplus language in an attempt to standardize its own review process.\(^{120}\) When the standards of review do not match, this can cause confusion among appellate court judges.\(^{121}\)

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\(^{114}\) Smith, *supra* note 113.

\(^{115}\) See also Bauman, *supra* note 3, at 526 (noting that some Pennsylvania courts confused standards of review with scope of review).


\(^{117}\) Kunsch, *supra* note 12, at 48.

\(^{118}\) Lopez, *supra* note 116, at 1350–52.

\(^{119}\) See Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485 (Colo. 1999) (stating that the practice by Colorado appellate courts of adding modifiers to the abuse of discretion standard in an attempt to clarify it resulted in confusion). See also Coenen, *supra* note 75, at 940 (asserting that one of the policy aims of appellate review is to legitimate the justice system by preserving the appearance and reality of fairness).


\(^{121}\) E.g., Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Kan. 2000) (acknowledging confusion in jurisdiction regarding applicable standard of review); Laura Whitmore, *Abuse of Discretion: Misunderstanding the Deference Accorded Trial Court**
An example of this phenomenon can be seen in the California cases. One court applied a unique standard of review that mysteriously made its way to motion for disqualification appeals, even though no previous court addressing that issue had applied such a standard. The appellate court stated that it would affirm the lower court decision if it was correct under any applicable theory of law and cited a medical board appeal opinion that never even addressed a motion to disqualify issue. But even in cases where the standard of review was one that was traditionally accepted, California appellate courts frequently cited to different opinions and described the standard differently from one another. When some of these appellate courts use a foreign standard of review, others state that the review is abuse of discretion, and still others cite authority that suggests the standard of review is de novo, substantial evidence, and abuse of discretion, what would seem a straightforward application of the standard of review becomes complicated.

Another example of inconsistency within standard of review application can be seen in the way California appellate courts define “abuse of discretion.” For instance, some courts define it with language that suggests the trial court abuses its discretion only if it acted unreasonably or without a rational basis. Other courts explained abuse of discretion review by stating that the trial court must act within the boundaries of the law it is applying. Some courts combined these two...
definitions. And yet others failed to define or expand the abuse of discretion standard at all.

How the court defined “abuse of discretion” may have had an effect on the appellate outcome. The courts that defined abuse of discretion using a rational basis definition reversed approximately one-fourth of those decisions. Courts that defined abuse of discretion using a law-based definition reversed thirty-five percent of the time. The appellate courts that used a combination of the above two definitions reversed nearly forty percent of the opinions while those that stated the standard of review without further explanation reversed only fifteen percent of the time. With this data, it is difficult to determine whether the definition of the standard influenced the outcome or whether the outcome influenced the definition or lack thereof. Nevertheless, this data demonstrates that appellate courts should consistently apply and define standards of review. If the court’s definition influences its interpretation of the standard’s scope, then having numerous definitions results in a suspect review process. Furthermore, parties who cannot realistically evaluate their success on appeal are more likely to appeal when the definitions change with the makeup of the court, which unnecessarily overburdens the appellate courts.

C. Problem Number Three: Standards of Review as Boilerplate

Practitioners are often encouraged to frame the issues on appeal strategically so as to take advantage of the standard of review that is most beneficial for their client. After all, “standards of review are debatable topics, not useless appendages to the brief, scribbled in as an afterthought.” Yet appellate courts sometimes treat standards of review as postscript, if even that. To be sure, this is probably the most common problem found with standards of review.

Many appellate courts merely cut and paste another court’s discussion on the standard of review into the opinion. There is no

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128 Id. (out of the 241 cases, forty-eight opinions combined these two definitions).
129 Id. (eighty-four opinions failed to further define the abuse of discretion standard of review).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See BEAZLEY, supra note 8, at 13.
134 Bosse, supra note 24, at 589.
135 See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 4, at 713 (stating that administrative law appellate judges appeared to ignore their obligation under de novo review).
136 See also BEAZLEY, supra note 8, at 13 (recognizing that even appellate attorneys often ignore the standard of review after they have included it in the appellate brief).
application and sometimes no further language from the standard of review found elsewhere in the opinion.\footnote{See, e.g., Cheyney Univ. v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'l Ass'n, 743 A.2d 405, 409 (Pa. 1999) ("[B]ased upon the number of challenges to arbitration awards, this court's standard of review has seemingly become a boilerplate standard lacking in real meaning or practical application."); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2004) (faulting courts with using standard of review boilerplate in the place of reasoned and explained analysis).} As one scholar stated, standards of review are “oft-repeated and little-analyzed by the courts.”\footnote{Allegra, supra note 32, at 493.} It is as if the standard of review serves no other function than to occupy the small space between the fact and discussion sections of the opinion.

Additional explanations and definitions, which are sometimes added onto the standard of review, seem to serve no purpose either because judges often block quote the expanded standard of review without further application or analysis. Though it is better to include a discussion of the standard of review in an opinion than not to include it, “a mechanical recitation of the relevant standard of review, without more, is no more helpful than completely ignoring the standards altogether.”\footnote{Hall, supra note 4, at 9.} However, that is what many appellate courts do time and time again. Consider the implications of what a federal judge said at an appellate conference about the role the court’s clerk plays in appellate brief writing:

I find it very useful to have the clerk set out the pertinent facts, describe the issues raised, and take a first stab at applying applicable precedent to those issues. But I do a fair amount of reorganizing of clerk drafts, I make substantial revisions to almost every paragraph, and about the only statements of black-letter law that I may leave untouched are boilerplate, such as standard of review.\footnote{Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 141, 189 (2006) (quoting a federal judge on the duties assigned to law clerks).}

Notice that the judge viewed the standard of review as boilerplate. This is a problem because judges will continue to ignore the purpose of standards of review and fail to apply them as long as standards of review are considered to be generic words with no practical meaning. To illustrate the point, we will briefly examine the standard of review that California uses for appeals from a motion to disqualify an attorney.

Motions to disqualify attorneys in California are examined using three standards of review depending on what is being challenged on appeal.\footnote{See People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. SpecDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 377 (Cal. 1999).} The facts supporting the trial court’s ruling are reviewed for substantial evidence, the ruling itself is reviewed for abuse of discretion,
and the legal conclusions (and some say the ruling itself, if the facts are not disputed) are reviewed de novo. By using three different standards of review to examine a single issue, California judges are more likely to be confused when they are called upon to apply the standard of review to the issues raised on appeal. To clarify matters for the parties before it and the trial court below where three possible standards of review can apply, appellate courts should clearly state in their opinion which standard of review applies and when. However, they often do not. Many California courts block quoted the standard of review language without any further discussion.

Including these three standards in a block quote without articulating which standard the court is using is not good practice since “[t]he invocation of multiple standards of review increases the number of opportunities for [appellate] judicial discretion—and judicial confusion.” Courts in Maine, Louisiana, and Michigan have encountered similar problems with this practice. The exercise of clearly articulating the standard of review removes speculation that the appellate court is using one standard when it is in fact using another.

143 See, e.g., Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that de novo review is appropriate where the trial court was not called upon to resolve material factual disputes).

144 See SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d at 1143–44.

145 See Edward J. Walters, Jr. & Darrel J. Papillion, Appellate Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: Due Deference to the Fact Finder, 60 L A. L. REV. 541, 541 (2000) (“Louisiana’s system of appellate review, which permits appellate courts to review both legal and factual determinations of trial courts in civil cases, has led to more than a little confusion as lawyers and judges have struggled to apply the correct standard of review in individual cases.”).

146 See Bauman, supra note 3, at 522 (standards of review are not always identified by an appellate court making it difficult to discern which standard applies).

147 E.g., In re Marriage of Eyster, No. C055881, 2008 WL 2623974, at *2–5 (Cal. Ct. App., July 2, 2008) (opinion includes a standard of review block-quote, an analysis that ignores the trial court findings, and a cursory declaration at the end of the opinion stating the trial court abused its discretion); Cochran v. Cochran, No. F050625, 2007 WL 2705745, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007) (mentioning fact that trial court has “discretion” in very last paragraph of appeal, after the appellate court reviews the record on its own). See also Mead, supra note 20, at 556–37 (noting that the Supreme Court of Maine does not always clarify which standard of review it is using and when, despite the fact that numerous standards are sometimes invoked to review an issue on appeal).


149 Richard A. Epstein, Why is This Man a Moderate?, 94 Mich. L. REV. 1758, 1774 (1996) (reviewing REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)). See also Whitmore, supra note 121, at 86 (stating that by giving appellate courts the option of choosing one of two abuse of discretion standards of review, it causes confusion and creates the appearance of inconsistency and unfairness).

150 See supra notes 145–49.

Treating standards of review as boilerplate creates another problem. Courts that give the standard of review such a meaningless role appear to misunderstand the true function standards of review serve. Standards of review shape the appellate court’s review process. Because reviewing lower court opinions is the job of an appellate court, how it conducts that review should be of utmost importance. As noted earlier, the standard of review guides the appellate court in determining the level of error the trial court committed and whether that error should form the basis for reversal. The standard of review should be the first thing an appellate court considers in the review process. Yet, so often it seems to serve no other purpose in the opinion than to take up space. As one scholar commented, appellate court review should not be “an irrelevant labeling exercise,” but the meaning of the standards of review is nevertheless sometimes lost on the courts. For a standard of review to work the way it was intended to work, however, it must be understood, applied, and used by the court to reach its decision. Until appellate courts fully understand the policy reasons behind standards of review, they will continue to merely pay the standard lip-service, while they ignore its true significance.

D. Problem Number Four: Courts Ignore Changed Standards of Review

Appellate courts may occasionally decide to review a trial court decision under a completely new standard of review, but it is less common to see a single standard of review reworded. However, in Texas, one standard of review was altered three times in the span of a decade.

rational basis when actually applying a different standard, state courts can avoid the confusion that the Supreme Court’s garbled standards have introduced into land-use jurisprudence.”); Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 252 (1998) (“[B]oilerplate language in appellate court opinions as to the standard of review may not describe the true behavior of those courts.”).

BEAZLEY, supra note 8, at 12.

Verkuil, supra note 4, at 682 (conducting an empirical analysis on scope of review outcomes in administrative law cases).

See Charles F. Baird, Standards of Appellate Review in Criminal Cases, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 707, 760–61 (2001) (“[A]ppellate court opinions must determine the appropriate standard of review and employ that standard to correctly resolve each point of error.”). See also Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 185 (“Discretion is an unruly concept in a judicial system dedicated to the rule of law, but it can be useful if it is domesticated, understood, and explained.”).


This is a highly unusual practice in the world of standards of review and one that allows for a unique analytical opportunity.

The author reviewed 7,895 decisions in Texas—dating from 1996 to 2008—where the defendant–appellant raised factual sufficiency as an issue on appeal. The author catalogued the following data after reading the cases: citation, publication status, court, year of decision, standard of review, participating judges, type of crime, whether the court affirmed or reversed the decision, the basis for reversal, and any subsequent history. The purpose of gathering the information was to determine whether the changed standard of review resulted in a changed outcome on appeal. A discussion of each standard of review and its significant substantive changes, followed by the empirical data of reversal outcomes, will demonstrate that the changes were largely ignored by the intermediate appellate courts.

1. The Evolution of Texas’s Factual Sufficiency Standard of Review

In 1996, Texas’s highest criminal court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, created a factual sufficiency standard of review for criminal appeals in Clewis v. State. Factual sufficiency is a standard of review that is used to determine whether enough evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict; it is analogous to the substantial evidence standard. Borrowing from a Texas civil factual sufficiency standard, the Clewis court held that an appellate court reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency “views all the evidence without the prism of ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution’ . . . [and] set[s] aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.”

A debate about the factual sufficiency standard of review Clewis created started immediately. Some of the criticism found in the dissenting opinions centered on the complaint that the new standard usurped the jury’s role. But another much more damning criticism against the Clewis standard focused on the language contained within the standard itself. Scholars argued that a standard of review for an issue of criminal factual sufficiency that is borrowed from a civil factual

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157 See Kunsch, supra note 12, at 12.
158 922 S.W.2d at 129.
159 Id. at 133.
160 Id. at 129. (quoting Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992, pet. ref’d, untimely filed)).
161 See, e.g., Mark Bankston, Case Note, Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 263, 276–79 (1997) (arguing that factual sufficiency review is necessary to correct unjust verdicts); Waddell & Abell, supra note 38, at 260–81 (assessing the potential conflicts with the new standard set out in Clewis, particularly as it fails to address factual sufficiency review for death penalty appeals).
162 Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 151 (en banc) (Mc Cormick, P.J., dissenting, Keller, J., joins); Id. at 159 (White, J., dissenting).
163 See Ryan, supra note 38, at 1302–03, 1307–09.
sufficiency standard of review allows the appellate court to “unfind” facts on a burden of proof that is substantially less onerous than the one imposed upon the jury during the criminal trial.\footnote{See id. See also Casey et al., supra note 33, at 322 (“The review standard should also include within it any burdens or presumptions from the substantive law applicable to the issue under review at the trial level.”); W. Wendell Hall & Mark Emery, The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the Review of Civil and Criminal Jury Verdicts, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 539, 577 (2008) (detailing criminal law practitioners’ disagreement with bringing civil law and criminal law appellate review together). See infra note 175, describing the complications that arise when courts mix burden of proof language with standard of review language.}

Eight years later, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals attempted to incorporate “beyond a reasonable doubt” language into its factual sufficiency review with \textit{Zuniga v. State}.\footnote{164} The court did so by stating:

There is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? However, there are two ways in which the evidence may be insufficient. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, there may be both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict. Weighing all the evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, so the guilty verdict should not stand. This standard acknowledges that evidence of guilt can “preponderate” in favor of conviction but still be insufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can “outweigh” the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.\footnote{165}

While \textit{Clewis} required a reversal when evidence of innocence outweighed evidence of guilt to the extent that the verdict was clearly wrong and manifestly unjust,\footnote{166} \textit{Zuniga} allowed reversal in instances when the evidence of guilt outweighed the evidence of innocence but was, nevertheless, still insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.\footnote{167} This standard arguably allowed appellate courts to “reverse on a whim.”

Two years after \textit{Zuniga}, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals yet again reconstructed the factual sufficiency standard of review in \textit{Watson v. State}.\footnote{168} The court declared that the \textit{Zuniga} standard of review was “problematic” because it allowed the appellate court to reverse the jury’s verdict merely because it disagreed with it, which was inconsistent with
the previous factual sufficiency standard of review articulated in Clewis.\textsuperscript{171} Stating that the Zuniga standard of review was flawed from the beginning and had a clear potential to cause too many reversals, the Watson court suggested a standard of review that looked similar to that in Clewis: “an appellate court must first be able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the \textit{great weight and preponderance} of the . . . evidence contradicts the jury’s verdict before it is justified in exercising its appellate fact jurisdiction to order a new trial.”\textsuperscript{172} Whether this articulation of the standard of review is satisfactory,\textsuperscript{173} it is the one that is currently used by intermediate appellate courts in reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency review.

2. Empirical Research on Texas’s Factual Sufficiency Standards of Review

Standards of review should theoretically be the first and most important consideration in evaluating a case on appeal. However, the empirical analysis of Texas’s factual sufficiency standard of review demonstrates that standards of review may not matter as much as they should and sometimes are ignored altogether by appellate judges. After three changes to the standard of review and numerous judicial opinions commenting on the various factual sufficiency standards of review, the data reveals that the changes in the standard did not change the outcome in any significant way.

Out of 4,231 opinions rendered using the Clewis\textsuperscript{174} standard of review, twenty-nine were reversed.\textsuperscript{175} That means only 0.685\% of the cases ended in reversal under Clewis.\textsuperscript{176} The Zuniga standard,\textsuperscript{177} which was criticized for having the potential to create a high amount of reversals,
was used to reverse fifteen out of 2,273 cases.\textsuperscript{179} The incident of reversals under \textit{Zuniga} was slightly lower than \textit{Clewis}'s with only 0.659\% of the cases reversed on appeal.\textsuperscript{180} The \textit{Watson} standard, which closely resembled the \textit{Clewis} standard of review, was used in 1,267 cases surveyed.\textsuperscript{181} The reversal rate, however, was less than half of \textit{Clewis}'s, with only four cases reversed, which amounts to a 0.315\% reversal rate.\textsuperscript{182}

According to the language of the standard of review and the commentary by scholars and judges, the \textit{Zuniga} standard of review allowed appellate courts to reverse the jury’s verdict too easily.\textsuperscript{184} However, the data shows that the intermediate appellate courts in Texas actually reversed fewer cases under the \textit{Zuniga} standard than under the \textit{Clewis} standard of review. It appears that the appellate courts simply ignored the changes occurring within the standard of review. The conclusion to be drawn from the similar \textit{Zuniga} and \textit{Clewis} reversal rates is that the Texas judges just pasted in the new boilerplate language for the standards of review and continued on as they had before.

That Texas appellate courts simply ignored standards of review can be shown by a different look at the same data. In 229 of the 7,895 Texas opinions reviewed, the appellate court failed to use the current standard of review.\textsuperscript{185} That means in nearly three percent of the factual sufficiency appeals in Texas, the appellate court was using a disfavored standard of review.\textsuperscript{186} One of the intermediate appellate courts in Texas intermittently used the \textit{Clewis} standard with no mention of \textit{Zuniga} for nearly a year and a half after the \textit{Zuniga} opinion was released.\textsuperscript{187} Only two of the fourteen intermediate appellate courts used the correct standard of review in every released opinion.\textsuperscript{188} This shows that Texas appellate courts treated the new standards as insignificant and interchangeable, though their language was not.

\textbf{a. Possible Non-Standard of Review Correlations for Reversal Rates}

Theoretically, courts reviewing a single issue with the same standard of review should have similar outcomes.\textsuperscript{189} However, commentators have

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[179] Texas empirical data, on file with author.
\item[180] \textit{Id}.
\item[182] Texas empirical data, on file with author.
\item[183] \textit{Id}.
\item[184] See \textit{Ryan}, supra note 38, at 1321–22. See \textit{supra} notes 165–72 and accompanying text.
\item[185] Texas empirical data, on file with author.
\item[186] \textit{Id}.
\item[187] Corpus Christi court data in Texas empirical data, on file with author.
\item[188] Texas empirical data, on file with author.
\item[189] See also Cook, \textit{supra} note 35, at 266–67 (noting that appeals in the Federal Circuit on patent claim construction cases lead to inconsistent and conflicting lines of authority, in part because of the high reversal rate under the \textit{de novo} standard of review).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
consistently linked extraneous factors to appellate reversal rates and have not been surprised by disparate appellate outcomes. One scholar, in analyzing scope of review standards in administrative law decisions, which mirror standards of review semantically and procedurally, noted the following about the importance of and difficulty in correlating outcomes with standards of review:

It is asking a lot to have scope of review standards reflect outcomes or reversal rates in a predictable way. Review standards have to be measured after the fact, and they are entangled with the inarticulate premises of judicial oversight. Cases have individual characteristics and an unknowable mix of law and facts, such that outcomes are hard to determine in advance. As with umpires, questions of judgment are complicated and calls are rarely obvious. Despite these difficulties, inquiring about outcomes can be a revealing exercise. The analysis can discern trends and highlight counterintuitive outcomes. Ultimately, the efficacy of a review system is judged by the results it produces. In a broad sense, affirmance, remand, and reversal rates are the results produced.

It is therefore important to analyze what factors, aside from the standard of review, may have affected reversal rates. The empirical data in California and Texas reveals that the specific court hearing the appeal, underlying tangential facts, and the subsequent history of the opinion contributed significantly to the final outcome on appeal. Arguably, these non-standard of review influences had a greater impact on the outcome than the use of the standard of review itself.

1. Reversal Rates Differed Among Courts

In both Texas’s factual sufficiency cases and California’s motions to disqualify attorney appeals, which court heard the appeal affected the outcome. For example, in Texas, some of the appellate courts with the smallest dockets had the highest reversal rates and the courts in major metropolitan areas reversed rarely, if ever. As one Texas commentator

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190 See Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 27, 45 (2007) (“Clearly, the most important influences on within-range rates are not the legal standards governing appellate review of judge-initiated departures, but the policies and programs of the Department of Justice.”).

191 Hall, supra note 4, at 18 (“Because the concept of discretion or choice defies uniform application to all situations, it is not surprising that the appellate courts’ review of discretion is not uniform.”).

192 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 724.

193 California and Texas empirical data, on file with author.

194 See Texas empirical data, on file with author. The Waco intermediate appellate court had the highest reversal rate at 2.564 percent; the Amarillo and Texarkana courts of appeal had similar percentages. Id. Cities with larger dockets, like the Houston courts of appeals, and the San Antonio and Dallas courts of appeals had reversal rates of less than one-third of one percent. Id. Three of the appellate courts-located in Eastland, Tyler, and one in Houston—did not reverse any cases over the twelve-year period. Id.
has noted, “It is . . . no secret that the courts of appeals produce varying results depending upon the make-up of the court.”\textsuperscript{195} Whatever the reason for the reversals or lack thereof, it appears that the group of judges hearing the case and the geographical, political, and representational location of the court had an effect on the outcome of the appeal.

The author examined 241 California opinions and tallied the reversal rates for each of the appellate courts.\textsuperscript{196} The most reverse-prone appellate court reversed half of the cases before it, while the court least likely to reverse did so only fifteen percent of the time.\textsuperscript{197} This statistic is even more determinative of the appellate outcome than how the court defined the standard of review.\textsuperscript{198} It appears that the various California appellate courts have different ideas about the level of wrongness required to reverse on appeal, despite using the same standards of review.\textsuperscript{199}

\textit{ii. Type of Offense Affected Reversal Rates}

A factor contributing to Texas’s factual sufficiency reversal rate was the crime for which the defendant had been convicted. Capital murder, murder, manslaughter, child sexual assault, robbery, and rape cases were included in the list of cases reversed for factual sufficiency.\textsuperscript{200} However, while those serious types of offenses generally make up a large portion of cases appealed on factual sufficiency grounds, they represented a minority of cases reversed.\textsuperscript{201} Drug possession, theft, misdemeanor, and simple assault cases encompassed the majority of reversals.\textsuperscript{202} Based upon these results, it appears that the type of case and the seriousness of the alleged offense may have affected the courts’ decision to reverse.

\textit{iii. Subsequent History Affected Reversal Rates}

In Texas, perhaps the most significant factor that correlates with reversal rates is the review of intermediate appellate court decisions by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed nearly thirty percent of the intermediate appellate court factual

\begin{enumerate}
\item Hall & Emery, \textit{supra} note 164, at 609.
\item California empirical data, on file with author.
\item See California empirical data, on file with author. The First District Court of Appeals in California had the lowest reversal rate while the Fifth District Court of Appeals in California had the highest rate. \textit{Id.} The Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeals had reversal rates of forty-five and forty-six percent, respectively, while the Second and Sixth Courts of Appeals had rates of thirty-eight and twenty-two percent, respectively. \textit{Id.}
\item De novo review resulted in a 62.5 percent reversal rate whereas abuse of discretion resulted in a reversal rate of 34 percent. California empirical data, on file with author.
\item See Rosenberg, \textit{supra} note 9, at 176.
\item Texas empirical data, on file with author.
\item \textit{Id.} These listed offenses represented only nine out of fifty-one reversals.
\item \textit{Id.} These crimes represented twenty-seven out of fifty-one reversals.
\end{enumerate}
Once remanded by Texas’s highest criminal court, each case that was initially reversed by the intermediate appellate court was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. This is not surprising, since scholars, through empirical analysis, have determined that lower courts are more likely to reshape their ideological preferences to avoid reversal by a higher court. However, it is difficult to argue that the Texas factual sufficiency review process is a judicially economic one when nearly one-third of all factual sufficiency appeals were reversed at the final appellate level. Not only is this problematic because it results in wasted judicial resources, but “a high proportion of reversals on review erodes public confidence in [the lower] courts.”

3. Conclusion

Texas courts, by and large, seemed to ignore the changes that the Court of Criminal Appeals made to the factual sufficiency standard of review. The difference in reversal rates between the three standards was largely inconsequential. Data seems to indicate that the makeup of the court, the underlying offense, and fear of reversal from a higher court affected the outcome more than the applicable standard of review. And though “[r]eview standards should not be directly tied to outcomes, . . . they should not ignore or contradict outcomes either.”

E. Problem Number Five: Judges Manipulate the Standards of Review

Judges sometimes have difficulty abiding with a lower court’s ruling when they disagree with it. A recent study revealed that judges are

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203 Texas empirical data, on file with author.
206 Kunsch, supra note 12, at 20.
207 See supra, notes 174–83, and accompanying text.
208 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 691.
209 See Charles A. Borek, Social Science Explanations for Disparate Outcomes in Tax Court Abuse of Discretion Cases: A Tax Justice Perspective, 33 Culp. U. L. Rev. 623, 634 (2005) (recognizing a judicial reluctance to defer); Coenen, supra note 75, at 907 (recognizing nine exceptions to deferential review of state law in federal court appeals); In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (stating that deferential review is “an abdication of our appellate responsibility”).
prone to believe their judicial decisions are more legally sound than the
decisions of others judges. As one scholar stated, “Like professors,
reviewing judges sometimes think they know an ‘A’ or an ‘F’ when they
see one, and grade accordingly.” Standards of review sometimes get in
the way of this appellate grading process.

Standards of review impose restrictions on the review process and
judges, if even reluctantly, must recognize that policy considerations such
as judicial economy and balance of power are best served through the
implementation of standards of review. Judges who attempt to force
what is in their view an equitable result must artfully maneuver their way
around the appropriate standard of review and the constraints it
imposes. In California, appellate judges do this in at least two different
ways. Some courts have taken clever routes to get de novo review, while
others have so liberally construed abuse of discretion review that it has
lost its traditional meaning. Before examining this manipulation of
standard of reviews, however, a brief history on the case that revised the
standard from abuse of discretion to a fusion of standards is necessary.

involving U.S. Magistrates and the fact that the judges in the study overwhelmingly
viewed their own decisions as more sound than other judges’ decisions); Hall &
Emery, supra note 164, at 606–07 (noting that some appellate courts sweep away
verdicts they are troubled with when there is legally sufficient evidence to support the
verdict).

211 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 690.

212 See Allegra, supra note 32, at 515 (stating that appellate judges must “observe
fastidiously the limitations on their authority”).

213 See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Garcia, Nos. 4D07-1793,
4D07-1796, 4D07-1797, 4D07-2515, 4D07-2600, 2008 WL 2986498, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Aug. 6, 2008) (Polen, J., concurring) (“Would I have reached the same result
the trial court reached in this case? Probably not. But our standard of review on
decisions granting or denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds
is abuse of discretion. If for no other reason than that reasonable judges could
disagree on the trial court’s ruling, I agree we must affirm.”).

214 See Justin F. Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction Of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2)
and (e)(1), 82 Tul. L. Rev. 385, 396–98 (2007) (complaining that federal courts
“cherry-pick” standard of review language in Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act cases); Coenen, supra note 35, at 963–1017 (examining circuit courts
decisions, which reveal that many of the circuits abandoned or created numerous
exceptions to deferential review of state law issues in federal appeals); Borek, supra
note 209, at 658 (citing the United States Tax Court with creating its own standard of
review rather than using a deferential one); Friendly, supra note 22, at 776–77
(recognizing that appellate judges get around discretionary review by finding an area
of law the trial court overlooked or misapplied or by claiming that the trial court’s
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the contested matter limits the discretion
afforded to its fact-finding role).
1. California’s Motion to Disqualify Standard of Review

Prior to the 1990s, appellate review of motions to disqualify was inconsistent in California. Starting in the 1950s and 1960s, when the earliest appeals of this kind surfaced, the appellate courts rarely used an obvious standard of review at all, though some opinions did briefly include “abuse” or “discretion” language in the opinion. Even in these early opinions where the term “abuse of discretion” appeared, the court rarely associated it with any standard-of-review-like function.

During the 1970s and 1980s, some attempts were made to formulate a discretion-respecting review process, but the language of these formulations was not at all consistent. For example, some of these opinions deferred to the trial court’s discretion unless the decision was one that was irrational or unreasonable. Many opinions simply stated that the standard of review was abuse of discretion, but offered no further guidance as to what the standard really meant. Still other opinions failed to mention any standard of review at all.

Language defining the abuse of discretion standard for disqualification motions began to become standardized in the late 1980s

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216 E.g., Earl Scheib, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 386, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (“The question before us is whether the respondent court abused its discretion in denying the motion on the grounds stated in its minute order and in refusing to determine the motion on its merits. This appears to be a case of first impression in California.”).

217 See, e.g., White v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding the trial court abused its discretion by entertaining a motion to disqualify opposing counsel when that motion was not submitted to the trial court earlier); Cornish v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 383, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (using the phrase “abuse its discretion” in concluding the trial court’s decision was correct).

218 See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Jensen, 252 Cal. Rptr. 14, 14, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (using the phrase “abuse its discretion” in the opinion and holding that the trial court, which had “broad discretion,” made a decision that was supported by facts and reason); Reynolds v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“We are cognizant of our duty to uphold respondent court in its ruling on a motion to disqualify if there is a rational basis in the record supporting the manner in which the court exercised the power and discretion vested in it.” (quoting Lyle v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).

219 E.g., Lyle, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 924 (“[W]e can overturn the determination of the trial court only if that court acted in excess of its jurisdiction or if there is no rational basis in the record supporting the manner in which the court exercised the power and discretion vested in it.”).

220 E.g., People v. Conner, 187 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“The decision of a trial court on a motion to recuse will be overturned only if the court abused its discretion.”).

and early 1990s.\textsuperscript{222} One case decided in 1986\textsuperscript{223} and another decided in 1989\textsuperscript{224} included definitions that suggested refusing to comply with the controlling legal principles constituted an abuse of discretion. Defining abuse of discretion in this way gained popularity in the mid to late 1990s.\textsuperscript{225} However, many cases at that time married the concepts of rationality with adherence to legal principles in defining abuse of discretion.\textsuperscript{226} Only one opinion, which was issued in the 1990s, made a strong argument for abandoning the rational basis language in abuse of discretion review altogether and adopting legal correctness language.\textsuperscript{227} But courts continued to vary in their definitions and their approaches to the abuse of discretion standard.

In 1999, the California Supreme Court expanded the standard of review for motions to disqualify attorneys in \textit{People ex rel. Department of Corp. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc.}\textsuperscript{228} California’s high court, in reversing the intermediate appellate and trial court decisions, set out the following revised standard of review for motions to disqualify attorneys:

Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. If the trial court resolved disputed factual issues, the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence. When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings, the appellate court reviews the conclusions based on those findings for abuse of discretion. However, the trial court’s discretion is limited by the applicable

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{222} \textit{E.g.}, \textit{Reynolds}, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (“We are cognizant of our duty to uphold respondent court in its ruling on a motion to disqualify if there is ‘a rational basis in the record supporting the manner in which the court exercised the power and discretion vested in it.” (quoting \textit{Lyle}, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 924)).
  \item \textsuperscript{223} \textit{Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Refining Co.}, 230 Cal. Rptr. 461, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“[J]udicial discretion is a legal discretion subject to the limitations of the legal principles governing the subject of its action, and subject to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is shown.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{224} \textit{Gregori v. Bank of Am.}, 254 Cal. Rptr. 853, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“In exercising its discretion, the trial court must make a ‘reasoned judgment’ and comply[ly] with the ‘. . . legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’” (quoting \textit{Bullis v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank}, 148 Cal. Rptr. 22, 30 (Cal. 1978)).
  \item \textsuperscript{225} \textit{E.g.}, \textit{In re Marriage of Zimmerman}, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“[I]n exercising discretion, the trial court is required to make a reasoned judgment which complies with applicable legal principles and policies.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{226} \textit{People v. Eubanks}, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 850–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (arguing that defining abuse of discretion with language that focuses on irrational or arbitrary decisions is too hard to overcome and that ultimately, rationally exercised discretion will come down to whether the judge applied the law correctly).
  \item \textsuperscript{227} 980 P.2d 371, 377 (Cal. 1999).
\end{itemize}
legal principles. Thus, where there are no material disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination as a question of law. In any event, a disqualification motion involves concerns that justify careful review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion.229

The Supreme Court found that because the trial court reached a legal conclusion in its holding and the facts at the hearing were uncontested, it would review the trial court’s decision de novo.230 Thus, SpeeDee Oil established a two-pronged test that appellate courts had to meet in order to use de novo review: (1) the trial court must have based its determination regarding disqualification upon the law, and (2) there were no material facts in dispute.231

Since SpeeDee Oil, the number of appellate courts using de novo review has increased dramatically.232 Currently, many appellate courts confronted with motion to disqualify appeals cite SpeeDee Oil and review evidence supporting the trial judge’s decision for substantial evidence, the decision itself, if substantial evidence exists, for abuse of discretion, and questions of law de novo.233 However, some courts cleverly maneuver around the SpeeDee Oil standard of review.

a. Creative Routes to De Novo Review

Before the SpeeDee Oil case, only two courts had used the de novo standard to review motion to disqualify attorney appeals.234 Since SpeeDee Oil, twenty-one courts have used de novo review to examine the trial court’s decision on whether to grant or deny a motion to disqualify opposing counsel.235 Some of those courts have used that standard under questionable circumstances.

229 Id. (citations omitted).
230 Id.
231 See id. Only one intermediate appellate court has recognized the two-pronged test SpeeDee Oil set out. Ali v. Survival Ins. Brokerage, Inc., No. B176349, 2005 WL 1864074, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2005) (“In our view SpeeDee does not support the proposition that the trial court’s exercise of discretion on a motion to disqualify counsel is subject to de novo review whenever the material facts were undisputed. Rather, SpeeDee held that the ruling on a motion to disqualify counsel is subject to de novo review only if the material facts were undisputed and the ruling was based on a legal conclusion.”). See also In re Complex Asbestos Litig., 283 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to use de novo review to examine cross-appeal because of deference to trial court resolutions).
232 See California data, on file with the author (noting 21 opinions using the de novo standard of review since SpeeDee Oil and only two using de novo review prior to SpeeDee Oil).
233 See id.
234 Lee G. v. Diane G., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 375, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (because evidence is not conflicting, the existence of the attorney-client relationship is reviewed de novo); Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (where trial judge made no findings of fact to support decision, appellate court reviews decision de novo).
235 See California empirical data, on file with author.
Traditionally, as explained earlier, the application of law by the trial court is reviewed de novo. As one academic stated:

The fast pace of trial court proceedings also limits the amount of useful information that trial judges receive. Lawyers at trial must focus on logistics, witness preparation, jury selection, jury argument, presentation of evidence, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and numerous, often unanticipated, questions of law. Burdened by these tasks, counsel often focus only limited attention on important legal issues. Consequently, the district court judge must rule on those issues with neither extended reflection nor extensive information.\footnote{Coenen, supra note 75, at 923.}

In contrast to the hurried schedule of a trial judge, appellate judges can focus more of their time on keeping abreast of the law and applying that law to specific legal issues.\footnote{Id. at 924–27.} Accordingly, the views of appellate judges on matters of pure law are esteemed more highly than those of trial judges; de novo review is a way of tipping the authority on legal issues in favor of the appellate judge.

De novo review is generally not used to review factual findings by a trial court.\footnote{See Childress, supra note 77, at 128 (asserting that de novo means that the appellate court gives the trial court decision no deference and does not necessarily require a full rehearing or new findings of fact); Coenen, supra note 75, at 919 (explaining that in federal appeals, judges avoid extensive appellate review, relying instead on deferential review); Borek, supra note 209, at 635 (“a highly deferential standard is generally appropriate when the issue being reviewed is factual, as opposed to legal, in character”); Stevenson, supra note 56, at 134 (faulting the Ninth Circuit for reviewing facts in a “quasi-de novo” way, even though it declared that it was using an abuse of discretion standard of review).} Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has expressed a concern over using the de novo standard for factual review.\footnote{Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).} In doing so, it warned “appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo.”\footnote{Id.} However, California appellate courts have, when it has served their purpose, creatively avoided applying the more deferential standards of review to factual disputes.\footnote{See Maloy, supra note 6, at 617 (noting that other state courts sometimes review facts de novo, though they “often do not clearly set forth the rationale for such rulings”).}

For example, one intermediate appellate court reviewed factual issues de novo by claiming that the facts were too unusual to warrant a more deferential review.\footnote{Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 595–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).} The court stated that because there was no precedent—due to the uniqueness of the facts—to guide the trial court,
“the trial court’s ruling cannot realistically be viewed as a routine exercise of discretion.”

In another instance, a California court admitted that because of the careful policy considerations involved with a motion to disqualify, many California appellate courts intentionally get around using the abuse of discretion standard of review. The court then went on to review the facts de novo and stated in its opinion that the trial court had “misunderstood” the facts. The appellate court stated that it believed it was in the same position as the trial court to review the record since the trial court did not hear live testimony at the hearing and did not make official findings of fact. The appellate court brushed off the trial court’s ability to make credibility decisions, claiming that because the trial court did not hear live testimony at the motion hearing, the appellate court was “equally equipped” to make credibility judgments.

The difference between the trial court’s perspective and the appellate court’s perspective that these reviewing courts failed to recognize, however, is that the trial judge knew the parties and their attorneys. As Maurice Rosenberg once stated, trial judges “‘smell[] the smoke of battle’ and can get a sense of the interpersonal dynamics between the [participants in the trial].” Factual review should be deferential because the trial court is in a much better position to believe or disbelieve testimony and witnesses based upon personal observation. Standards of review are not to be cast aside merely because an appellate court wants to interpret the facts differently.

Another California appellate court cunningly abandoned the abuse of discretion standard by claiming that “the trial court did not even purport to exercise discretion.” Discretion is generally not something that is announced before it is exercised; rather, discretion is inherent in every trial court determination. This is yet another example of an appellate court’s desire to get past the appropriate standard of review.

243 Id.
246 Id.
248 Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 183.
Appellate judges who review the trial court’s factual findings de novo give a “hard look” at those factual determinations. This close examination results in higher reversal rates, which causes judicial inefficiency by requiring both the appellate and trial courts to complete the same task: factual review. It creates an imbalanced judicial system by allowing the appellate court to reverse the trial court’s findings of fact when the trial court is in a superior position to make such findings. Finally, it generates more appeals because it gives appellants hope that the reviewing court might disagree with the lower court’s factual findings.

One Ninth Circuit commentator observed the following:

[T]he Ninth Circuit . . . erred by examining the facts too closely and making independent determinations as to what the facts meant, rather than using the facts in the record to review the propriety of the district court’s decision. The problem with this sort of quasi de novo review of the facts is the lack of evidence and witnesses in front of the appellate court.

Because of its discomfort, the Ninth Circuit drew its own bare conclusions despite the clear availability of findings by the district court.

Statistical data of the motion to disqualify attorney cases suggests, as expected, that de novo review results in more reversals than abuse of discretion. Of the 241 cases that the author reviewed, twenty-four opinions expressly used de novo review and fifteen of those cases were reversed. The reversal rate for cases with de novo review was 62.5%.

As stated earlier, some of these cases involved de novo review of facts, not law. But, by using unorthodox means to get to de novo review, some of the courts were able to more easily reverse the trial court on determinations of fact, which is not a traditional use of de novo review.
b. Abuse of Discretion Liberally Defined

While there are many gradations of abuse of discretion in any jurisdiction, it is still a highly deferential standard. Courts across the country hold that a judge has abused his discretion by making an arbitrary or unreasonable decision.\(^{250}\) Some commentators have complained that it is such a strong burden that the standard, as traditionally defined, is virtually impossible to overcome on appeal.\(^{260}\) However, other commentators have noted that the abuse of discretion standard has been, in recent years, watered down.\(^{261}\) For example, scholars have charged courts in Oklahoma and the Ninth Circuit with rendering the abuse of discretion standard meaningless.\(^{262}\) Regardless of the view that one takes on this issue, the exercise of discretion is something that trial judges implement routinely. One commentator stated,

If there is any common core of meaning, it is that “discretion” has something to do with choice. Where someone acts under compulsion, she cannot be said to exercise discretion. But discretion also implies something more than mere choice. It suggests that a decision should be made not randomly or arbitrarily, but by exercising judgment in light of some applicable set of standards, guidelines, or values. Those standards or norms may rule

\(^{250}\) *E.g.*, State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516, 522 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (an abuse of discretion occurs where the ruling was so arbitrary that it cannot be said to be the result of a reasoned decision); Johnson v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 305 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Minn. 1981) (stating that a decision will not be reversed unless arbitrary); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (abuse of discretion amounts to a “decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be a clear and prejudicial error of law”); Blakemore v. Blakemore, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ohio 1983) (stating that an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable); Manus, Inc. v. Terry Maxedon Hauling, Inc., 191 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”) (internal citations omitted).

\(^{260}\) See *Painter & Welker*, supra note 56, at 226 (observing that reviewing courts using an abuse of discretion standard “require outrageous or heinous conduct for reversal”). *But see Childress*, supra note 77, at 138–39 (suggesting that there are different shades of discretion); Daniel D. Blinka, *Practical Inconvenience* or Conceptual Confusion: The Common-Law Genesis of Federal Rule 703, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 467, 556 (1997) (“Staring at a cold record armed with only an abuse of discretion standard of review, appellate courts can be reluctant to second-guess trial judges with holdings that are extremely fact intensive and, thus, of limited precedential value.”); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 184 (charging some courts with throwing around the word deference so carelessly that it becomes “promiscuous deference”).

\(^{261}\) *See*, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 56, at 138 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit created a quasi-de novo standard of review in its abuse of discretion standard); Bradley W. Welsh, *Original Jurisdiction Actions As a Remedy for Oklahoma’s Decision Deficit*, 57 OLA. L. REV. 855, 858 (2004) (“The problem with . . . the supreme court’s exercise of discretion in reviewing the district court’s own ‘discretionary’ decision essentially renders the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard contentless.”).

\(^{262}\) Stevenson, supra note 56, at 138; Welsh, supra note 261, at 858.
out certain options while still permitting the decisionmaker to exercise some choice. 265

Appellate courts are not always so magnanimous about a trial court’s choice, however. Courts have been known over time to cut away trial court discretion in favor of appellate court discretion. 264 Judge Friendly noted this phenomenon in the Ninth Circuit court more than 25 years ago, 266 but the trend continues today in many jurisdictions, including California.

The California Supreme Court, in defining the scope of discretion in motion to disqualify attorney appeals, stated in SpeeDee Oil that a trial court’s “discretion is limited by the applicable legal principles.” 266 This definition of the abuse of discretion standard of review sounds more like a de novo definition than an abuse of discretion definition. 267 And while this definition is not without precedent, 268 it gives the appellate court more room to reverse trial court decisions than a more deferential definition. 269 California is not the only jurisdiction using de novo-like abuse of discretion review; the Ninth Circuit has applied what one commentator called “quasi-de novo” abuse of discretion to examine factual issues in a federal class action lawsuit. 270

Because abuse of discretion is defined in different ways, 271 even within a single jurisdiction, it is hard to gauge what abuse of discretion standard reversal rates should look like. Since abuse of discretion is theoretically the most deferential standard of review, one could assume

263 Kim, supra note 7, at 408–09.
264 Friendly, supra note 22, at 763 (noting that Ninth Circuit opinions afforded less discretion to trial courts over a twenty-year period). See also Fallon, supra note 21, at 1312 (suggesting that the fact that there are three versions of strict scrutiny review allows justices to vary the applicable version “to reflect their personal views concerning the nature and significance of the rights involved in particular cases.”).
265 Friendly, supra note 22, at 763. See also Coenen, supra note 75, at 963 (stating that “the rule of deference is crumbling at the edges” before criticizing several circuit courts for abandoning or failing to use it as it was intended to be used).
266 People ex rel. Dep’t of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 377 (Cal. 1999).
267 See Borek, supra note 209, at 642 (asserting that the tax courts’ review under an abuse of discretion standard of review appears more consistent with de novo review); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 179 (recognizing that the most diluted abuse of discretion review can mirror de novo review).
268 See Davis, supra note 25, at 59 (noting that abuse of discretion is sometimes defined as going outside the bounds of the legal standards).
269 See Allegra, supra note 32, at 493 (noting a divergence from true abuse of discretion review among administrative tax court decisions).
270 Stevenson, supra note 56, at 134.
271 Friendly, supra note 22, at 763–64 (describing various abuse of discretion definitions).
that it would hypothetically have the lowest reversal rate.\textsuperscript{272} In California, however, trial court decisions on motions to disqualify attorneys were reversed 34\% of the time using an abuse of discretion review.\textsuperscript{275} While this is certainly a lower rate of reversal than the 62.5\% de novo reversal rate, it is still incredibly high when one considers that the \textit{SpeeDee Oil} Court stated “the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s express or implied findings [of fact].”\textsuperscript{274} Unfortunately, it appears that is exactly what the intermediate appellate courts are doing when collectively they are reversing a third of all trial court decisions. Regardless of the characterization of the abuse of discretion standard used by California’s appellate courts, the reversal rates indicate that the appellate courts are not giving much credence to the trial court’s findings of fact.

Whether the appellate courts in California were using de novo review in unorthodox ways or granting less discretion with a traditionally deferential review, it is apparent that at least some of the time, the reviewing courts exercise more authority over trial court decisions than they should. Judges must exercise self-control over the desire to change a decision that another judge rendered when the standard of review prohibits such a change. By doing this, appellate courts ensure that the judicial system is appropriately balanced and that the system is economically viable.

V. MEASURES FOR CHANGE

Standards of review are not broken beyond repair. There are several ways to rework the wording and application of standards of review. Some jurisdictions have reworded them so that their meaning is less vague.\textsuperscript{275} This is not an arduous task since the judges are often the ones who delineate the reach of the jurisdiction’s standards of review.\textsuperscript{276} By creating more definite standards that mirror the rules of substantive law, appellate judges would be less likely to be confused by the standard of review’s conceptually open nature.

\textsuperscript{272} See, e.g., Verkuil, \textit{supra} note 4, at 689 (hypothesizing an affirmance rate of eighty-five to ninety percent for arbitrary and capricious review in administrative law appeals).

\textsuperscript{274} See California empirical data, on file with author.

\textsuperscript{275} People \textit{ex rel.} Dep’t of Corps. v. \textit{SpeeDee Oil Change Sys.}, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 377 (Cal. 1999).

\textsuperscript{276} \textit{E.g.}, State v. Lambert, 787 A.2d 175, 177 (N.H. 2001) (abandoning traditional standards of review language for more definite language). Urquhart v. Urquhart, 854 A.2d 193, 195 (Me. 2004) (advocating simpler standard of review terminology). See also Lee, \textit{supra} note 56, at 42 (suggesting that courts should consider replacing traditional standard of review language, which tends to confuse, with simpler language).

\textsuperscript{277} Mead, \textit{supra} note 20, at 524 (“It is interesting to note that appellate standards of review are limitations that the appellate courts have placed, by and large, upon their own prerogative to substitute their judgment for that of the trial court.”).
Another consideration is one that has been advocated for years by scholars: judges must understand the general policy reasons for standards of review and the policy reasons behind their application to each issue raised on appeal.277 In other words, courts need to examine the standards’ purposes and the policy considerations raised by the appealed issue, and determine whether the issue and its correlating standard of review are appropriately matched.

The standard used for motions to disqualify attorneys is a good example of a standard of review that may need to be revised. If the reasons behind granting or denying a motion to disqualify an attorney are factually heavy, yet complicated by ethical and legal issues that are difficult for a trial judge to resolve, then it may be better for appellate courts to change the standard of review altogether or create a new standard that reflects the competing factual, ethical, and legal issues.278 In order to do this, however, appellate judges must spend time analyzing the purpose behind the law and the policy reasons for the applicable standard to determine whether they compliment each other. As stated earlier, each standard of review is used for a specific reason. Sometimes the purpose of the standard of review needs to be reevaluated, especially when the law has evolved over time but the standard of review has not. After all, “[i]t is much more forthright and intellectually sound to confront the issues on a policy level than to obfuscate the review process with more boilerplate . . . followed by more unexplained application.”279

Appellate courts must be held accountable for confusing and misusing standards of review. Frequent reexamination of their purpose and practical worth is one way to achieve this goal. Appellate courts must not assume that new or even experienced appellate judges understand the “moods” expressed by standards of review.280 Were appellate courts to mandate standard of review training for judges, clerks, and interns, some of the problems outlined in this Article might be avoided.

In jurisdictions where there is more than one level of appellate review, the highest reviewing court needs to ensure that all intermediate courts are using the same standard and properly applying the standard to each case. By doing so, the highest court would guarantee that the appropriate standards of review are being used and that they are being worded and applied consistently.

Finally, attorneys could use additional appellate relief to hold appellate courts accountable when they manipulate standards of review. If the appellate judiciary knows that appellate attorneys are likely to file motions for reconsideration or additional appeals due to their erroneous

277 See, e.g., Kunsch, supra note 12, at 29 (“Instead of trying to force questions into rigid categories, a court should turn to policy analysis.”).
278 See, e.g., Borek, supra note 209, at 626 (advocating a modified standard of review for more evenhanded review of taxpayer appeals).
279 Kunsch, supra note 12, at 49.
280 Casey et al., supra note 33, at 284.
application or manipulation of the applicable standards, they may be less inclined to abuse standards of review. Nevertheless, with empirical research, attorneys are more likely to convince appellate courts that they are either not being consistent in their use of standards of review or that they are ignoring standards of review in their judicial oversight function.

VI. CONCLUSION

Standards of review serve a purpose. They facilitate a better judicial system by balancing power among trial and appellate judges. They ensure judicial economy of time and resources. They create a standardized review process. And, they give notice to parties about the likelihood of success on appeal.

On a more basic level, they are the practical rules that serve to guide the appellate court’s review of every case before it. However, these purposes are being missed or ignored by members of the appellate judiciary. Appellate judges must abide by the terms they have set for their review. Standards of review are not to be lauded when the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s determination and abused when the reviewing court disagrees with the lower court’s decision.

When appellate judges better understand standards of review, appreciate the policy reasons for them, and exercise self-control in their application, they are more likely to see consistent and fair results that rise above suspicion. Moreover, when the standard permeates the opinion, it demonstrates that the appellate court used the standard to guide its review process. By implementing these practices, standards of review can achieve their purpose of guiding appellate judicial review, which is not unattainable.