BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Lewis & Clark//NONSGML v1.0//EN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20140309T100000 RDATE:20140309T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20141102T090000 RDATE:20141102T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T163500 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T180000 LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575 SUMMARY:"Nothing in Ethics Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution?? by Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis & Clark College) DESCRIPTION:Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with other phil osophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goo dness approach\, that claims moral evaluations are\, or are on a par with \, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized by how well they function as spe cified by the species to which they belong. In this essay\, I first sketc h the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second\, I argue that c ritics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsistent with evolutio nary biology due to its species essentialism are incorrect. Third\, I con sider the prospects of understanding ethical normativity as a species of biological teleology claiming that this would be incompatible with our co nsidered moral judgments. Fourth\, after presenting gene-culture coevolut ion theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling naturalism and norm ativity in accordance with the natural goodness approach requires amendin g the selected effects function account to include cultural evolution. Ho wever\, this approach\, though not biologically reductionistic\, still ge nerates claims incompatible with our considered moral judgments. Finally\ , I end with a discussion of methodology and revisionistic moral theories . X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with other philosophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goodness approach\, that claims moral evaluat ions are\, or are on a par with\, teleological claims made in the biologi cal sciences. Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized b y how well they function as specified by the species to which they belong . In this essay\, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness ap proach. Second\, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approac h is inconsistent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentiali sm are incorrect. Third\, I consider the prospects of understanding ethic al normativity as a species of biological teleology claiming that this wo uld be incompatible with our considered moral judgments. Fourth\, after p resenting gene-culture coevolution theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling naturalism and normativity in accordance with the natural goo dness approach requires amending the selected effects function account to include cultural evolution. However\, this approach\, though not biologi cally reductionistic\, still generates claims incompatible with our consi dered moral judgments. Finally\, I end with a discussion of methodology a nd revisionistic moral theories.
UID:20140403T233500Z-25994@www.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140331T113941Z URL:https://www.lclark.edu/live/events/25994-nothing-in-ethics-makes-sens e-except-in-the-light CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140401T235020Z ATTACH:https://www.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/crop/1 /44880_jay_odenbaugh.rev.1396291353.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25994 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://www.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/heigh t/80/crop/1/44880_jay_odenbaugh.rev.1396291353.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with ot her philosophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goodness approach\, that claims moral evaluations are\, or are on a par with\, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized by how well the y function as specified by the species to which they belong. In this essa y\, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second \, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsist ent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentialism are incorre ct. Third\, I consider the prospects of understanding ethical normativity as a species of biological teleology claiming that this would be incompa tible with our considered moral judgments. Fourth\, after presenting gene -culture coevolution theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling na turalism and normativity in accordance with the natural goodness approach requires amending the selected effects function account to include cultu ral evolution. However\, this approach\, though not biologically reductio nistic\, still generates claims incompatible with our considered moral ju dgments. Finally\, I end with a discussion of methodology and revisionist ic moral theories. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|humanities|philosophy c olloquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student|symposia END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR