Volume 40, Issue 1

WINTER 2010—FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

Table of Contents

TRIBUTE

Words from the First Editor-in-Chief
Ann Morgenstern Reynolds

FORWARD

Ashes and the Phoenix
Ronald B. Lansing

The following six excerpts are from my book manuscript (a memoir in progress) tentatively titled Crystallizing: The Accreditation Era of Northwestern School of Lewis & Clark Law School (1965–1974). The excerpts focus on the first five or six years of the forty-year old Environmental Law. The segments, taken out of context, will be better understood with these background materials:

  1. My account of that era is a memoir. I lived the times as one of the five original faculty. The text, therefore, is written in first-person, from my witness and research.
  2. The era began in 1965 when two venerable colleges merged—one a law school and the other a liberal arts and sciences school. Both traced their origins back to Oregon pioneer times in the 1800s. Joined, they became contractually titled Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College.
  3. In spite of its veneration and strong acceptance in the bench and bar of Oregon, the law school had never bothered to become recognized by the two national law school accrediting agencies: the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Association of Law Schools (AALS). Now, in 1966, the school began upon that quest.
  4. Among many accrediting requirements was the need for building a law school complex. The law school and its evening education never had a home of its own. It had operated out of various rented quarters in downtown Portland. Having moved to the Lewis and Clark campus, the law school still did not have its own building complex. Nighttime law education was temporarily spread throughout the campus, once undergrad classes were put to bed. Schooling was conducted in chemistry, literature, and other liberal arts and sciences classrooms. The 7000-book law library was in the basement of a music hall. Law school headquarters were improvised in two residential homes owned by the college and shared by the language department. A law dean, associate dean, four professors, and three staff were officed in bedrooms, dining rooms, and kitchens. My office was the living room in one of the houses. The law school was quartered in that fashion for four years, in wait for the building of its Tryon Forest home, which was not completed until fall semester of 1970.
  5. Lewis and Clark college trustees and administrators had a heavy hand in its new law school management. The trustees created a Standing Committee on the Operation of the Law School (SCOLS), composed mainly of trustees, Oregon Supreme Court justices, trial judges, prominent lawyers, and other dignitaries, plus the law school dean and one law professor. SCOLS formed subcommittees on law school admissions, buildings, budget, development, and other ad hoc matters. The small, newborn law faculty was at the threshold of law schooling and just beginning to peek at and squeeze into the business of operations. Paths were fated to cross.

It was in such humble settings that Environmental Law was conceived, gestated, born, and christened.

ARTICLES

Capping Carbon
David M. Driesen

This Article addresses the problem of how to set caps for a cap- and-trade program, a key problem in pending legislation addressing global climate disruption. Previous scholarship on emissions trading programs focuses overwhelmingly on trading’s advantages and sometimes wrongly portrays environmental improvement as an automatic byproduct of adopting a cap-and-trade approach. A trading program’s success, however, depends critically upon timely and effective cap setting.

This Article shows that often regulators have employed a best available technology (BAT) approach to cap setting for trading programs, i.e., setting the cap at a level that regulated polluters can achieve with government-identified technology. This descriptive claim suggests that trading does not necessarily provide an antidote to the problems associated with BAT regulation, as the literature often claims; instead, trading programs often constitute a form of BAT regulation in many respects. The rest of the Article explores this insight’s implications.

Analytically, this Article reviews three ways to establish aggregate caps: effects-based, cost-benefit based, and technology-based cap setting. It shows that each of these approaches has theoretical and practical advantages and disadvantages, but only effects-based cap setting frees the regulator from the need to evaluate technologies in order to establish a cap.

Since trading does not automatically transcend BAT, this Article provides recommendations on how to improve cap setting both generally and in the climate disruption context. It suggests that in the climate disruption context, a legislative effects-based approach offers an attractive and viable cap-setting method. But normative acceptance of effects-based caps requires some adjustments in how we think about costs—mainly a recognition that they are neither fixed nor predictable, but can change as a result of a cap-and-trade program.

This Article also shows that auctions can play an important role in facilitating avoidance of the problems of administrative delay and strife that accompanied BAT regulation. While commentators usually agree that auctions offer economic advantages, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to their administrative advantages. We should think of auctions as essential to effective cap setting, not just as a nice way of avoiding unattractive distributional consequences like windfall profits. But this Article also explores how the possibility of BAT-like administrative delay should influence criteria and administrative procedures for agency distribution of allowances to firms. Finally, this Article makes recommendation on how cap-setting decisions can circumvent favoritism toward existing sources and the difficulty of revising limits once establishes—both BAT problems that can arise under trading as well. Thus, jettisoning the notion that trading automatically avoids problems traditionally associated with BAT leads to a set of useful insights about how to set caps.

Climate Exceptionalism
By John Copeland Nagle

“Climate exceptionalism” is the belief that the problem presented by climate change is different from the air pollution problems that we have addressed in the past. The Supreme Court appeared to have rejected that claim in Massachusetts v. EPA, when it held that greenhouse gases are pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Air Act. But climate exceptionalism persists as advocates emphasize the differences between climate change and traditional air pollution, and as they question whether the entire pollution paradigm is appropriate for responding to climate change.

This Article explores the debate about climate exceptionalism. It identifies the ways in which climate change is like other air pollution problems and the ways in which it is different. It then analyzes how the debate concerning climate exceptionalism affects the preferred response to climate change. If climate change is simply the latest air pollution problem, then the tools that we have developed to respond to pollution can be deployed to address climate change. But if climate change is exceptional, then the lessons of air pollution regulation may be less suitable, and other strategies should be developed instead. The broader understanding of pollution as a phenomenon that exists outside of environmental law shows why multiple responses to the emission of greenhouse gases is preferable to mitigation, adaptation, tolerance, or any other single purported solution to the problem of climate change.

Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing, but a “Realistic Threat” of Harm is a Better Standing Test
Bradford Mank

In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Supreme Court recently rejected the proposed test for organizational standing in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion based upon the statistical probability that some of an organization’s members will likely be harmed in the near future by a defendant’s allegedly illegal actions. Implicitly, however, the Court had previously recognized some form of probabilistic standing in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, which found standing where plaintiffs avoided recreational activities because of “reasonable concerns” about future health injuries from pollution; Summers did not overrule Laidlaw. There is an inherent tension between the Summers and Laidlaw decisions. This Article applies the Summers and Laidlaw frameworks to the facts in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency (NRDC II), where the D.C. Circuit found standing because the government’s exemption from regulation of certain uses of methyl bromide, an ozone-destroying chemical, would cause two to four lifetime skin cancer cases among NRDC’s members. Both Summers and Laidlaw produce questionable results when applied to NRDC II’s facts.

The “realistic threat” test in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Summers offers a better approach to standing than either Summers’s unrealistic demand that plaintiffs precisely predict the future or Laidlaw’s focus on whether a plaintiff avoided recreational activities rather than whether the defendant’s activities caused actual harm. There was a more realistic threat of harm in Summers than Laidlaw, but the Court found standing in the latter case and not the former case. The Court’s current approach to standing for organizational plaintiffs and probabilistic risks is seriously flawed and the realistic threat test offers a more rational approach to assess which injuries are sufficiently serious for standing in Article III federal courts. Furthermore, a realistic threat test for standing is more consistent with congressional intent in enacting several citizen suit statutes that are involved in the vast majority of cases in which constitutional standing is at issue. The Court should abandon both the Summers and Laidlaw approaches to standing and instead adopt Justice Breyer’s proposed realistic threat test to achieve more equitable and uniform standing determinations. 

REPORT

Exempt Well Issues in the West
Nathan Bracken

Executive Summary

There are over a million exempt domestic and livestock wells located throughout the West. Although these wells are an important source of water for a large number of water users, they also pose significant regulatory and administrative challenges that have the potential to impact the sustainability of water supplies, surface flows, and water quality.

In June 2008, the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) and the Western States Water Council (WSWC) issued a report entitled Water Needs and Strategies for a Sustainable Future: Next Steps, which contained recommendations on how the states and federal government should address the ever-increasing challenges associated with water management in the West. Item 3(D) of the Next Steps report’s Executive Summary recommends that states “should examine their related laws and institutions and evaluate the merits of … [permitting and monitoring] exempt domestic and livestock wells as part of water rights regulatory schemes.” The WSWC’s Legal Committee subsequently commissioned this Report, which addresses 1) the statutory and regulatory authority among WSWC member states regarding exempt domestic and livestock wells, 2) the ways in which these wells can complicate or compromise water resources allocation, administration, and quality, 3) the specific challenges WSWC member states are facing with respect to exempt wells, 4) the relative costs and benefits associated with monitoring wells that are currently exempt, and 5) the potential approaches to mitigate the adverse impacts of exempt wells.

NOTES

Flipping Daubert: Putting Climate Change Defendants in the Hot Seat
Ryan Hackney

Can climate change plaintiffs use Daubert challenges to exclude testimony by defense experts? Since the Supreme Court announced the standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., it has been used almost exclusively to the benefit of defendants. There is no theoretical reason, however, why plaintiffs could not use Daubert challenges to exclude testimony by defense witnesses in a scientific field in which the great weight of scientific research supports the plaintiffs’ claims. It is likely that in many cases climate change litigation will present such a situation. This Note considers four ways in which plaintiffs may use the Daubert standard and the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude and restrict defense testimony: challenge the witness, challenge the reliability of the evidence, challenge the fit of the evidence to the case, and challenge the conclusions a witness may draw from otherwise admissible evidence.

Part II of this Note examines the field of climate change litigation and considers the kinds of scientific disputes that are likely to arise in future litigation. Part III looks at the Daubert standard and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part IV applies the Daubert standard to actual cases of “experts” and scientific assertions that prominent climate change skeptics have publicly advanced in the debate over climate change. Part V considers what conclusions can be drawn from this analysis, both for the future of climate change litigation and for the broader public debate over climate change.

This Note suggests that Daubert challenges by climate change plaintiffs may impact not only climate change lawsuits, but could also provide a blueprint for Daubert challenges by plaintiffs in other litigation contexts. The Note also suggests that changing the debate over climate change in the courtroom could improve the quality of the debate in the public arena. Even if every climate change plaintiff loses his or her case, climate change litigation may still have beneficial consequences if these lawsuits can help steer the national discourse away from spurious debates over uncertainty and toward a more honest evaluation of what is going on and what we can do about it. 

Rumors of Conley’s Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: The Impact of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly on Pleading Standards in Environmental Litigation
Brook Detterman

Environmental claims are often complex, subject to scrutiny at the pleadings stage, and “disfavored” by some courts. As a result, pleading standards in federal court are of special importance to the environmental practitioner. In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, the Supreme Court changed its pleading standards language, potentially creating a new “plausibility” standard and generating much confusion for courts and litigators alike. Subsequently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court announced that Twombly’s discussion of pleading standards is applicable in all civil cases, and Twombly has been cited in well over 12,000 civil decisions to date.

This Note examines the Twombly decision and its application to civil environmental claims, arguing that the decision does not create a new pleading standard under the Federal Rules, but instead redefines the elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief in a Sherman Act section 1 conspiracy case grounded on a theory of conscious parallelism. Although Twombly blurred the line between antitrust substance and procedure while clarifying the language of Conley v. Gibson, it did not modify pleading standards in federal court.

BOOK REVIEW

Review of Large-Scale Ecosystem Restoration: Five Case Studies from the United States
Joel A. Mintz